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Abstract
When choosing among alternatives, group members may have various preferences 
regarding the properties of a solution being sought. Since the properties partially 
do and partially do not meet their collective wishes, the alternatives are in fact bet-
ter or worse representatives of the collective will. This idea is implemented in the 
so-called Third Vote election method aimed at enhancing policy representation, and 
we show how to use it for collective multi-criteria decision making. To be specific, 
we consider an example of a committee charged with naming a campus library when 
neither plurality vote nor Condorcet method nor Borda count gives a unique solu-
tion. The committee members have differing opinions, such as whether the library 
should reflect the national affiliation, be named after a great man, relate to sciences, 
and so forth. Balancing opinion on these issues, the proposed library names are 
evaluated and the optimal compromise is found.
Keywords Collective multi-criteria decisions · Third Vote election method · Theory 
of voting
JEL Classification D71
The only way to rectify our reasonings is to make them as tangible as those of the 
Mathematicians, so that we can find our error at a glance, and when there are 
disputes among persons, we can simply say: Let us calculate, without further ado, 
to see who is right.
 Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716)
Leibniz GW (1685) The art of discovery. Letter to Philipp Spener. In: Wiener PP (1951) Leibniz 
Selections. Charles Scribners Sons, New York, p. 51.
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1  Introduction: Library Names as Representatives of Collective 
Opinions
From the formal viewpoint, ‘representatives’ need not be individuals. In Tangian 
(2017a), they are not persons but political parties. Now we take it one step further, 
requiring of representatives no human nature at all, only a capability to stand for the 
interests of a group of people. More specifically, when choosing among an assort-
ment of alternatives, the group members may have various preferences regarding the 
properties of a solution being sought. Since the properties partially do and partially 
do not meet collective wishes, the alternatives can be considered better or worse rep-
resentatives of the collective wills.
This idea is reflected in the Third Vote election method (Tangian 2017b).1 It was 
designed to implement the relatively recent concept of policy representation—how 
the party system and the government represent the policy preferences of the elector-
ate (Budge et al. 2001; Budge and McDonald 2007; Volkens et al. 2013), which is 
not supported by conventional voting by candidate name. Correspondingly, under 
the Third Vote, the individuals cast no votes for candidates but are asked about their 
preferences on policy issues raised in the candidates’ manifestos: Domestic deploy-
ment of federal armed forces?—Yes/No; Increase taxes for passenger diesel cars?—
Yes/No, etc., just like in voting advice applications (VAA) (Garzia and Marschall 
2014; Vote Match Europe 2020; You vote EU 2020) but without advising how to 
vote. Instead, the answers are processed to reveal the policy profile for the electorate 
that indicates the balance of public opinion for each question. The degree to which 
the candidates’ policy profiles match with it is expressed by the candidates’ indices 
of popularity (the average percentage of electors represented on all the questions) 
and universality (the percentage of questions when a majority is represented). These 
indices are analogous to preference proximity measures in the Condorcet method in 
its rigorous version (Young 1988) with the difference that (a) they are applied not to 
preference matrices but vectors of policy profiles and (b) they enable weighting of 
policy issues according to their importance, whereas weighting of elements of pref-
erence matrices makes little sense. If the candidates are political parties, the parlia-
ment seats are distributed among them in proportion to their indices.
The necessity for such a sophistication is caused by two reasons. The first one 
is the irrationality of the voters who, disregarding electoral manifestos, may vote 
contrary to their own political preferences for the ‘wrong’ candidates (Manin 
1997; Adams et al. 2011). One explanation is the ‘paradox of the platform’ Brams 
(1976)—voters rate candidates ‘in general’, in particular because of the understand-
ing of the political spectrum as a left-right ideological axis that is too simplistic 
(Tangian 2019b, 2020, Chapters 9 and 14) and results in the so-called ‘blind corner 
1 The name ‘Third Vote’ was given to oppose the method to the German two-vote system, within which 
it has been tested (Tangian 2017c; Third Vote 2020; World Forum for Democracy 2016, 2019). The 
two-vote system is used also in Bolivia, Ethiopia, Lesotho, New Zealand, Thailand, South Africa, South 
Korea, United Kingdom (Scotland, Wales, and the London assembly) (Mixed-member 2020). In fact, the 
Third Vote can be used alone or combined with any conventional voting method (Tangian 2019a).
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of political representation’ (Thomassen 2012). The Third Vote surmounts this phe-
nomenon by redirecting the voters’ attention from the charisma of candidates, com-
munication skills and ideological labels to subject matters.
Another argument for the Third Vote is overcoming the constraints imposed by 
conventional voting. We remind that if the choice alternatives are more than two, a 
simple plurality vote can cause the Borda paradox, in which the winner is actually 
the least desired by an absolute majority. A pairwise vote can result in cyclic order-
ings with no winner—the classical Condorcet paradox. Successive pairwise voting 
that excludes the losers at each step enables manipulation of the outcomes by tweak-
ing the order in which the pairs are put to the vote, etc.; see Black (1958), Nurmi 
(1999), Gehrlein and Lepelley (2011). Unlike these voting methods, the Third Vote 
consists of several Yes/No votes on dichotomous policy issues which are obviously 
not exposed to paradoxes. The electorate’s policy profile is composed of balances 
of public opinion on the issues, and since the electorate is considered a single body, 
neither paradox can emerge.
Collective decisions made by conventional voting by name are subject to all 
known voting paradoxes. To surmount them, the Third Vote can be used, and the 
given paper shows how to do this in collective multi-criteria decision making 
(MCDM). To be specific, we consider an example of a committee charged with 
naming a campus library—the problem in fact dealt with by Professor of University 
Paris I and President of the Condorcet Campus in Paris–Aubervilliers, Jean-Marc 
Bonisseau. In this context, library names represent wishes of the supervising com-
mittee whose members have differing opinions, such as whether the library should 
reflect the national affiliation, be named after a great man, relate to sciences, and 
so forth. Regarding the balances of opinion on these issues, the preselected library 
names are evaluated using the already mentioned indices of popularity and univer-
sality. The indices help to find the optimal compromise and bring the committee to a 
rational consensus.
Using these indices bridges the MCDM-techniques and some approaches from 
the field of social choice. As early as in the 1980–1990s, the outranking methods for 
MCDM have been developed (Pardalos et al. 1985; Vincke 1992; Roy 1996; Schär-
lig 1996). We recall that an alternative A outranks an alternative B if there exists a 
sufficient majority of criteria for which A is better classified than B (concordance) 
and if the unfavorable deviations for the rest of the criteria (discordance) are not too 
high (Zopounidis 1999).
The social concordance for alternative A versus B can be measured by the uni-
versality index. Then the universality of A is the percentage of criteria (questions, 
in our terminology) that indicate a social preference for A rather than B. Thereby, a 
‘sufficient majority of criteria’ corresponds to a high universality. A low concord-
ance, or an ‘insufficient number of criteria’, corresponds to a low universality. The 
degree of social discordance can be measured by the popularity index. The popular-
ity of A is the mean size of the social groups satisfied with the alternative’s particu-
lar qualities (criteria); thereby, A is judged from the viewpoint of ‘public approval’ 
of its properties, not in comparison with other alternatives. The popularity of A is 
high if it is supported by large groups regarding most criteria and opposed by small 
groups regarding the rest of the criteria. This is exactly the same as ‘the unfavorable 
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deviations for the [rest of the] criteria are not too high’. Consequently, the discord-
ance is low if the popularity is high and vice versa.
As for relevant approaches in the field of social choice, we refer to the proposi-
tion aggregation in multiple elections (Brams et al. 1998). Multiple election is selec-
tion from bundles of accepted/rejected propositions, e.g. (Create new jobs, Reduce 
student fees), (Create no new jobs, Reduce student fees), etc. Under the proposition 
aggregation each proposition is voted on separately, and the desired bundle is deter-
mined. If it is not available, the one that is closest to it is selected. In other words, 
electors vote for particular characteristics of the alternatives, then the combination 
of the most desired bundle of characteristics is taken as a reference, being analogous 
to the electorate’s policy profile, and the closest among the available alternatives, 
which are analogous to candidates’ profiles, is selected.
Currently, the mathematical problem of how to best satisfy a collective with a 
composite program is studied within a new branch of social choice theory called 
judgment aggregation (Grossi and Pigozzi 2014; Lang et al. 2017; List 2012; List 
and Puppe 2009). In a sense, our approach is in line with it, having relevance to 
some other fields as well. For instance, the voters’ Yes/No answer to a question 
imply voting at a time for several candidates that share the same position on the 
issue—it will be clearly seen from both Table 1 and Fig.  1. Thereby, the operation 
on every question resembles approval voting, where electors are allowed to vote for 
all acceptable candidates (Brams and Fishburn 1982; Laslier and Sanver 2010).
Section 2, ‘Data Structure’, explains how the model framework is adapted to the 
MCDM problem considered.
Section 3, ‘Computing Popularity and Universality Indices’, traces the computa-
tion of the library name indices of popularity and universality.
In Sect. 4, ‘Choosing a Library Name by the Third Vote’, the popularity and uni-
versality indices are transformed into virtual votes for library names under the Third 
Vote method and its combination with the conventional vote.
In Sect. 5, ‘Consistency Analysis of Individual Preferences’, we test the commit-
tee members’ preference orderings of library names for consistency with their opin-
ions on the particular properties of library names.
Section 6, ‘Conclusion’, emphasizes that the model for finding the best represent-
atives is quite universal. It can be also used in a ‘soft’ form—not for making final 
decisions but to rationalize deliberations for finding a rational consensus.
2  Data Structure
We consider a French academic committee, which is faced with the task of choos-
ing a name for the humanities library. The committee consists of five members 
A, B, C, D and E, each having one vote. After a few meetings, the following three 
library names (candidates) are included in the short list: 
Bibliothèque des Encyclopédistes  (denoted ‘Encyclopedists’) after the authors of 
the major endeavor of the Enlightenment—the 
famous 35-volume Encyclopédie (1751–1772) 
1 3


































































































































































































































































































edited by Denis Diderot and Jean-Baptiste 
d’Alembert, which contained 71,818 articles by 
leading philosophers and scientists, including 
Voltaire, Montesquieu and Rousseau.
Bibliothèque Jean-Paul Sartre  (denoted ‘Sartre’) after the renowned French 
philosopher, playwright, novelist, political 
activist, biographer and literary critic Jean-Paul 
Charles Aymard Sartre (1905–1980), a key fig-
ure of the European intellectual left of the 20th 
century.
Bibliothèque Max Weber  (denoted ‘Weber’) after the German sociologist, 
philosopher, jurist and political economist Max-
imilian Carl Emil Weber (1864–1920), whose 
ideas, together with that of Émile Durkheim 
and Karl Marx, profoundly influenced social 
theory and social research.
Table 2 displays the preference orderings of the committee members (the VAA-indi-
ces in parentheses are explained and used in Sect. 5). Table 3 shows that neither pair-









-100% -50% 0 50% 100%         
Percentage of NO/YES votes
5. Related to natural sciences?
4. Related to political economy?
3. Related to the Enlightenment?
2. Name of a person?
1. Associated with France?
NOYES
Fig. 1  Matching of the library names with the opinions of the committee
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Table 2  Committee members’ preference orderings of library names with their individual VAA-indices





Weber (4) Sartre (6) Weber (4)
2 Sartre (2) Sartre (2) Sartre (3) Weber (3) Encyclopedists (3)










Plurality vote 2 1 2
Borda score (sum of ranks) 1+1+3+3+2=10 2+2+2+1+3=10 3+3+1+2+1=10
nor simple plurality vote nor Borda method of ranks result in a unique solution. It 
turns out that there is no consensus on five characteristics of the library name shown 
in Table  1.
The characteristics of the three library names, the opinions of the committee mem-
bers, the balances of opinions on the issues and question weights are collected in 
Table 1. The first question on the national affiliation of the library name is regarded as 
most important and, as we assume, is double weighted. To collect data for Table 1, a 
special Third Vote ballots can be used, for instance, as the one in Table 4.
Figure 1 visualizes Table 1, displaying how well the library names match with the 
committee’s wishes. For every question, the balance of committee opinions is shown 
by the grey bar. Its length is equal to 100%, and the prevailing committee opinion is 
visualized by the bar’s bias from the center, as it surpasses the dotted line demarcat-
ing the 50% threshold. Every library name is depicted by a color rectangle. The ‘No/
Yes’ conformity with a given issue is reflected by the position of the rectangle to the 
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3  Computing Popularity and Universality Indices
Two bottom rows of Table  4 show the popularity and universality indices of the 
library names. To be specific, we trace their construction for Encyclopedists. For 
Question 1, ‘Associated with France?’, it embodies the wishes of three out of five 
committee members, resulting in its representativeness regarding Question 1:
For Question 2, ‘Name of a person?’, Encyclopedists represent the wishes of two out 
of five committee members, resulting in the representativeness
For Questions 3–4, it represents 3∕5 = 60% of the committee, and on the last ques-
tion it represents 4∕5 = 80%.
Taking the weighted average representativeness of Encyclopedists across the 
five questions, we obtain Encyclopedists’ popularity index
Encyclopedists’ universality index is the total weight of the questions for which this 
library name represents the wishes of at least a non-strict majority of the committee. 
It is the case for all questions except Question 2, whence
The indices of other library names are computed in the same way. For efficient vec-
tor formulas to compute the indices see (Tangian 2014, p. 245).
4  Choosing a Library Name by the Third Vote
The popularity and universality indices enable choosing the library name by the 
Third Vote or by its combination with the conventional plurality vote. The com-
putational steps are displayed in Table 5. The first two columns show the popular-
ity  and universality  indices from Table 4. The plurality vote from Table 3 
is given in absolute numbers of votes (Abs) and in normalized units (Norm)—
reduced to the total of 100%. Column ‘Third Vote‖Abs’ is the mean of popular-
ity and universality indices, and its Norm-version ‘Third Vote‖Norm’ shows their 
reduction to the total of 100%. The combination of the conventional plurality vote 













































Norm’ and ‘Third Vote‖Norm’. The result is displayed in the last column of the 
table. If desired, this mean can be weighted in any proportion.
Every normalized index in Table 5 is the ‘percentage of support’ received by 
the library name under the corresponding election method. For each method, the 
frame indicates the winner. In our case, the winner is always Encyclopedists.
5  Consistency Analysis of Individual Preferences
The last point is testing the consistency of the committee members’ preferences 
for library names as shown in Table 2 with their responses to the specific ques-
tions in Table 4. If, for instance, a committee member’s most preferable library 
name is Encyclopedists but, at the same time, he/she rejects its relation to politi-
cal economy and natural sciences, then such an inconsistency calls into question 
the rationality of the member’s voting behavior.
To test the individual preferences on logical consistency with voter profiles, 
we run a kind of VAA-simulation. For the profile of every committee member 
and that of every library name (= the corresponding columns in Table  4), we 
define the matching index—the total weight of the questions for which the pro-
files coincide. Obviously, the higher the index, the better the individual wishes 
are fulfilled, indicating, if the committee member is rational, a higher position for 
the library name in the preference ordering.
For example, the profiles of A and Encyclopedists are identical (see Table 4), 
resulting in the matching index 6/6, which in Table 2 is displayed without denom-
inator as (6). The profiles of A and Sartre coincide for Question 1 only. Due to the 
question’s double weight, Sartre in Column A of Table 2 is indexed 2/6 denoted 
by (2). Finally, the profiles of A and Weber coincide for Question 4, resulting in 
the matching index of 1/6 denoted by (1). Since the library name matching indi-
ces in Column A of Table 2 decrease, we conclude that A’s preference ordering is 
absolutely consistent with A’s answers to Questions 1–5.
Table 5  Indices of library names by the conventional and Third Vote methods and their combinations; 
the highest indices (of the winners) are in frames
Indices of repre-
sentativeness
Plurality vote Third Vote P+U2 Plurality vote/
Third vote
P U Abs Norm Abs Norm Norm
% % % % % %
Encyclopedists 60 83 2 40 72 45 a 43
Sartre 47 50 1 20 48 31 25
Weber 43 33 2 40 38 24 32
aThe result of floating point computations rounded at the end may differ from that if rounding is made at 
every step. For instance, 1.4 + 1.4 = 2.8 ≈ 3 , whereas 1.4 + 1.4 ≈ 1 + 1 = 2.
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The matching indices in all other columns of Table  2 also decrease, prov-
ing that the individual preference orderings are all rational, so the model can be 
trusted completely.
6  Conclusion
Thus, we have shown how to apply the Third Vote to MCDM-problems. It can 
also be useful when voting by alternative name gives no unique solution. In 
particular, the Third Vote is more universal than conventional voting schemes 
because it is not exposed to paradoxes of conventional voting.
It should be emphasized that the Third Vote should not necessarily replace the 
established procedure of the committee decision making if there is some tradition or 
legal prescriptions. It can be regarded as an instrument of attaining a rational con-
sensus in the sense of deliberative democracy (Fishkin 2009, 2019). One can also 
use the model to reduce the number of alternatives to two and then apply voting, 
thereby avoiding cyclic majorities.
We argue that the indices of popularity and universality used in the Third Vote 
evaluate the representative capability of candidates (alternatives) more adequately 
than the percentage of votes by name. Under conventional voting, the candidates are 
voted on by disjoint groups of their adherents, whereas under the Third Vote, every 
candidate is also supported by the adherents of other candidates who share the same 
position on the given question. Instead of many voter groups, there are only Yes-
group and No-group on every issue (ignoring those who abstain), which are usually 
quite numerous. In other words, the groups of candidate adherents join (differently 
on each question), providing a stronger support for weak candidates. Thereby, the 
Third Vote reveals the full representative capability, and the candidates with com-
mon positions represent them jointly rather than exclusively, justifying minority 
governments as well as Downs’ coalitions of minorities (Downs 1957, pp. 55–60); 
this is illustrated in (Tangian 2020, Chapters 8 and 13).
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